Hume's Philosophy of Religion (Part I)




In 1802, William Paley published a book titled Natural Theology: Evidences of the Existence and Attributes of the Deity, Collected from the Appearance of Nature. 

Natural theology describes an attempt to infer the existence of God from the existence of the world (or some feature of the world). Interestingly, Paley’s book was published twenty-six years after the death of David Hume, and twenty-three years after the publication of Hume’s Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. Why is that interesting? Because (some) philosophers believe Hume’s Dialogues function as an epitaph for the death of natural theology.

The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy contains the following entry on Hume’s philosophy of religion:

“Whatever interpretation one takes of Hume’s philosophy as a whole, it is certainly true that one of his most basic philosophical objectives is to discredit the doctrines and dogmas of traditional theistic belief.”

Historian of science, Christopher Hamlin, wrote:

“To philosophers and theologians, David Hume is usually seen as the vanquisher of natural theology, particularly that form known as design arguments.”

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Lets look at Paley's argument briefly. In his Natural Theology, Paley introduced the watchmaker. The watchmaker (as an argument) is an example of the aforementioned design argument.  Paley wrote:

“Let's say you're walking around and you find a watch on the ground. As you examine it, you marvel at the intricately complex interweaving of its parts, a means to an end. Surely you wouldn't think this marvel would have come about by itself. The watch must have a maker. Just as the watch has such complex means to an end, so does nature to a much greater extent. Just look at the complexity of the human eye. Thus we must conclude that nature has a maker too.”

Hume’s Dialogues contain an early version of the argument. Hume put the argument this way:

“Look round the world, contemplating the whole thing and every part of it; you’ll find that it is nothing but one big machine subdivided into an infinite number of smaller ones, which in their turn could be subdivided to a degree beyond what human senses and faculties can trace and explain. All these various machines, and even their most minute parts, are adjusted to each other so precisely that everyone who has ever contemplated them is filled with wonder. The intricate fitting of means to ends throughout all nature is just like (though more wonderful than) the fitting of means to ends in things that have been produced by us—products of human designs, thought, wisdom, and intelligence. Since the effects resemble each other, we are led to infer by all the rules of analogy that the causes are also alike, and that the author of nature is somewhat similar to the mind of man, though he has much larger faculties to go with the grandeur of the work he has carried out. By this argument a posteriori, and by this argument alone, do we prove both that there is a God and that he resembles human mind and intelligence.”

The argument Hume is criticizing is similar to Paley's argument. Hume argued that comparing our world to any human artifact would lead to absurdities. Instead of a watch, Hume used the example of a ship.

“When we survey a ship, we may get an exalted idea of the ingenuity of the carpenter who built such a complicated, useful, and beautiful machine. But then we shall be surprised to find that the carpenter is a stupid tradesman who imitated others, and followed a trade which has gradually improved down the centuries, after multiplied trials, mistakes, corrections, deliberations, and controversies. Perhaps our world is like that ship·. It may be that many worlds were botched and bungled, throughout an eternity, before our present system was built; much labour lost, many useless trials made, and a slow but continued improvement carried on during infinite ages in the world-making trade. In such subjects as this, who can determine what is true—who indeed can even guess what is probable—when so many hypotheses can be put forward, and even more can be imagined?”

If the world is like a watch, or a ship, some theologically suspect conclusions seem to follow. For example, are not artifacts like watches, ships, and buildings often the latest embodiment of a series of earlier imperfect versions? Must we not entertain the possibility that our world may be only the latest version in a series of botched earlier versions? After all, the world gives the appearance (think evil and suffering) of not always working efficiently.

This is only the beginning of the problem. Hume continued, writing that,

“A great many men join together to build a house or ship, to found and develop a city, to create a commonwealth; why couldn’t several gods combine in designing and making a world? This would only serve to make divine activities more like human ones. By sharing the work among several gods we can reduce still further the attributes of each one of them; we can get rid of the extensive power and knowledge that we have to suppose the one God to possess (if there is only one)—the extent of power and knowledge which, according to you, serves merely to weaken the argument for God’s existence. And if such foolish, vicious creatures as men can often unite in forming and carrying out one plan, think how much more could be done by those gods or semi-gods whom we may suppose to be quite a lot more perfect than we are!”

When we see a house being built, or any complicated structure, is it not often the result of many workers and designers? Might polytheism be one implication of this argument? The argument leads to absurd conclusions, or at least conclusions deeply incompatible with ethical monotheism (Judaism and Christianity).

So, is that author of the Stanford Encyclopedia correct? Does Hume's criticism discredit natural theology? Before we lower the casket into the ground, I'd like to consider an argument from an important, but neglected, philosopher - a philosopher who thinks we've misunderstood Hume's criticisms. It may be that the rumors of natural theology's death have been exaggerated.


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